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EQUALIZATION OF ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX
ASSESSMENTS- 1975 EVENTS
In the past 15 years there has been a growing list of cases' and legisla-
tion' dealing with the equalization of property tax assessments in Illi-
nois.-' The most recent additions to this list are the Illinois Supreme
Court decision in Hamer v. Lehnhausen' and the Illinois General Assem-
bly's enactment of House Bill 990 (H.B. 990). 5 It is the impact of these
two recent developments on the equalization process which is the focus
of this Comment.
In accordance with a constitutional mandate,6 the Revenue Act of
1. See, e.g., Harte v. Lehnhausen, 60 Ill.2d 542, 328 N.E.2d 543, cert. denied, 96 S.Ct.
216 (1975) (equalization and the state common school fund); Hamer v. Mahin, 47 Ill.2d
252, 265 N.E.2d 151 (1970) (lower court has the power to determine extent of compliance
required as to equalized assessments); People ex rel. Hamer v. Jones, 39 Ill.2d 360, 235
N.E.2d 589 (1968) (nonuniform equalized values recognized, dismissed for not stating a
cause of action upon which relief could be granted); People ex rel. Musso v. Chicago, B.
& Q. R.R., 33 Ill.2d 88, 210 N.E.2d 196 (1965) (Dep't of Local Gov't Affairs not only an
equalizing agent, but also the initial assessing authority for railroads); Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. v. Department of Revenue, 17 Ill.2d 376, 161 N.E.2d 838 (1959) (order directing Dep't
of Revenue to assess and equalize all property subject to taxation as required by law);
People ex rel. Ruchty v. Saad, 411 Ill. 390, 104 N.E.2d 273 (1952) (mandatory equalization
duty of the Dep't).
2. The various provisions of the Revenue Act of 1939 have been amended frequently in
recent'years. See, e.g., P.A. 78-707, §1, [1973] I1. Laws 2123-25 (eff. Sept. 10, 1973),
amending Ii.. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §629a (1975); P.A. 78-707, §1, [1973] Ill. Laws 2123,
2125 (eff. Sept. 10, 1973), codified as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §632a (1975); P.A. 77-2829,
§56, [19721 11. Laws 2266, 2473 (eff. Dec. 22, 1972), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
§§500.23-1, 501, 627, 629a, 632 (1975); P.A. 76-2516, §1, [1970] Ill. Laws 1017 (eff. Jan.
1, 1971), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §657 (1975). Some of the same provisions
amended by the aforementioned acts have been amended again with the passage of House
Bill 990, P.A. 79-703 (eff. Sept. 3, 1975). See note 5 infra.
3. Equalization of assessments is the adjustment of aggregate values of prop-
erty as between different taxing districts, so that the value of the whole tax
imposed upon each taxing district shall be justly proportioned to the value of
the taxable property within its limits, in order that one county or taxing district
shall not pay a higher tax in proportion to the value of its taxable property than
another.
People ex ret. Bracher v. Orvis, 301 Il. 350, 353-54, 133 N.E. 787, 788 (1921).
4. 60 1ll.2d 400, 328 N.E.2d 11 (1975).
5. P.A. 79-703 (eff. Sept. 3, 1975), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § §482, 488-89, 501,
50la-i, 501b-1, 502, 502a-1, 502a-3, 524, 530, 532, 535, 537, 555, 557, 561, 563, 568, 581,
589.1, 612, 627, 629a, 630, 632a, 643, 643a, 645a, 728a, 804 (1975).
6. ILL. CONST. art. IX, §1 provides that the general assembly shall provide such revenue
as may be needed by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property. More specifically,
the constitution provides:
SEcTION 4. REAL PROPERTY TAXATION
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19397 required all property to be uniformly valued at "fair cash value."
Originally defined as 50 percent of actual value,' a recent amendment
has changed this uniform valuation figure to 33 1/3 percent? In order
to insure that this figure is complied with throughout the state, the
Illinois Department of Local Government Affairs (the Department) is
authorized to act as an equalizing authority. 0
The system which has been developed for valuing real property in
Illinois involves two steps:" first, the local assessor values the individual
property within a given county; 2 second, the Department adjusts the
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon real property
shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall
provide by law.
(b) Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may hereafter pre-
scribe by law, counties with a population of more than 200,000 may classify or
to [sicl continue to classify real property for purposes of taxation. Any such
classification shall be reasonable and assessments shall be uniform within each
class. The level of assessment or rate of tax of the highest class in a county shall
not exceed two and one-half times the level of assessment or rate of tax of the
lowest class in that county. Real property used in farming in a county shall not
be assessed at a higher level of assessment than single family residential real
property in that county.
Id. §4.
7. ILiL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§482-811 (1975).
8. Law of August 12, 1971, ch. 120, §482(24), [1971] Il1. Laws 1496, 1498, as amended,
ILi.. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §484(24) (1975). The terms assessed value and actual value will
appear often in this Comment. Actual value is synonymous with fair market value, the
price a property will sell for on the open market between a willing buyer and a willing
seller. The assessed value is the value that is found on the assessment roll for the specific
property. Theoretically, it would be ideal if assessed value equalled actual value, but as
a practical matter this is impossible. Therefore, assessed value is usually a fraction of
actual value. The term equalized value is used when the assessed value is converted
(equalized) to the level required by law.
9. P.A. 79-703 (eff. Sept. 3, 1975), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §484(24) (1975).
See text accompanying notes 45-55 infra.
10. h.L. REv. STAT. ch. 120, §§611(7), 627 (1975). The very existence of the Department
is in question in Lehnhausen v. Downs, 60 Ill.2d 528, 331 N.E.2d 65 (1975) (appeal trans-
ferred for further consideration). As recently as March 14, 1975, the Legislative Joint
Subcommittee to Study the Property Tax proposed to remove the multiplier function from
the Department entirely. Reply Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 4, Hamer v.
Lehnhausen, 60 Ill.2d 400, 328 N.E.2d 11 (1975).
11. See generally People ex rel. Tennyson v. Texas Co., 406 11. 120, 129, 92 N.E.2d 142,
147 (1950); People ex rel. Isbell v. Albert, 403 Ill. 469, 474, 86 N.E.2d 237, 240 (1949);
People ex rel. Little v. Collins, 386 I1. 83, 97, 53 N.E.2d 853, 859 (1944); Note,
Constitutionality of State Equalization of Property Assessments in Illinois, 17 U. Cm. L.
REV. 93 (1949).
12. The duties and powers of assessors appear in scattered sections of The Revenue Act
of 1939, however, see generally I.L. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§483-88 (1975). Generally, the
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total assessed values of the different counties so that tax levies can be
proportioned among them. This latter step is the equalization func-
tion. 13 The Department examines the abstracts of the property within
the taxing districts and then determines the actual level of assessed
value. 4 The actual level of assessed value in each county is then multi-
plied by a figure (the multiplier) which will raise or lower the final
valuation figure to conform to the fair cash value requirement.15
It is important that all property be assessed at the same level
throughout the state since the total assessed valuation of a county
determines the qualifying rates used by the state in the distribution
of grants for education," public assistance funds," and other state
assessors must assess all property at its fair value and make certain that all valuations of
the same type of property are uniform. See Rackham, New Technology: Its Management
and Use By the Assessor, THE NATION'S REVENUE SYSTEM 68, 69 (1973).
The Department of Local Government Affairs, however, has the initial assessment
authority over certain types of property, i.e. railroads and stock assessment. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 120 (1975). This authority is over a very limited area, and it is separate from
the equalization procedure. See People ex rel. Musso v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 33 Ill.2d
88, 210 N.E.2d 196 (1965); Hamer v. Mahin, 13 Ill.App.3d 51, 299 N.E.2d 595 (2d Dist.
1973).
13. See note 3 supra. The Illinois Supreme Court noted in several prior decisions that
the purpose of the equalization procedure was to prevent one county from paying a higher
tax in proportion to the value of its taxable property than another county. See People ex
rel. Ingram v. Wasson Coal Co., 403 Ill. 30, 85 N.E.2d 182 (1950); People ex rel. Isbell v.
Albert, 403 I1. 469, 86 N.E.2d 237 (1947); People ex rel. Bracher v. Millard, 307 Ill. 556,
139 N.E. 113 (1923). See also 1 ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
A COMMISSION REPORT: THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX 21,
129 (1963) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. Since there is no state-wide ad
valorem tax, these decisions are no longer completely applicable. The purpose of equaliza-
tion now is to prevent counties from obtaining an unfair share of state funds. See notes
16-18 and accompanying text infra. The constitution permits the legislature to apportion
the tax burden of overlapping taxing entities, with the necessity of equalization. ILL.
CONST. art. IX, §7. If the distribution of state aid were eliminated as based upon equalized
assessed value there would be no need for equalization. See note 19 infra.
14. There are two basic methods for establishing equalized values-the appraisal ap-
proach and the sales analysis approach. An examination of these methods is not within
the scope of this Comment. For further discussion see R. STAUBER, THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN WISCONSIN: AN INTRODUCTION 101-06 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
STAUHERI; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 48.
15. I,. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §630 (1975).
16. IILL1. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §18-8 (1975) (method of apportionment from common school
fund). The equalization rate determined by the Director of the Department of Local
Government Affairs is used to compute total equalized assessed valuation for purposes of
determining each school district's appropriate share from the common school fund. Specif-
ically, to be eligible for the basic state grant of $520 per child, the local school district
may levy a tax of $1.08 per $100 of assessed valuation as equalized. After that contribution
by the local school district, the remainder of the $520 comes from the common school fund;
e.g., if the levy of $1.08 raised $200 per child, the state grant from the common school
fund would equal $320 per child. If the assessed valuation as equalized is overstated, the
qualifying share is higher and the state's contribution is less.
17. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §12-21.13 (1975) (amount of local funds required to qualify
for state public aid funds).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:725
aid."' Distribution of these funds is inversely proportionate to the as-
sessed value. The lower the assessed value of a county, the greater the
amount of state funds received by that county.'" Thus, equalization is
needed in order to preclude counties with improperly low assessed value
from having an advantage in the distribution of state funds.
The Illinois Supreme Court has clearly ruled that the duty of the
Department to act as an equalizing authority is mandatory. 0 The prob-
lem addressed in Hamer and in H.B. 990 is the Department's consistent
refusal to comply with this mandatory duty. Unfortunately, neither
Hamer nor H.B. 990 provides an effective method of compelling the
recalcitrant Department to fulfill its responsibilities.
HAMER v. LEHNHAUSEN
Taxpayer-plaintiffs in Hamer v. Lehnhausen2' sought to compel local
and state officials to perform their statutory duty to equalize and assess
all property at its fair cash value." During the course of the lower court's
proceedings, evidence showed that equalized values for 1973 and 1974
throughout the state ranged from a high of 53.23 percent to a low of 25.13
percent.3 Consequently, the trial court entered an order enjoining the
Department and its director from certifying, without prior court ap-
proval, final 1974 multipliers for any county which would result in a
18. See, e.g., Ii.. REv. STAT. ch. 121, §6-501 (1975) (distribution of highway funds); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 122, §17-2.4 (1975) (vocational education building funds).
19. There is presently a suit pending which seeks to have those statutes which provide
for the distribution of state funds based upon the assessed value of a taxing district
declared unconstitutional. Hamer v. Dixon, Docket No. 75CH137 (Cir. Ct. Lake Cty., Ill.,
filed April 8, 1975).
20. People ex rel. Ruchty v. Saad, 411 Ill. 390, 394, 104 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1952).
21. 60 11.2d 400, 328 N.E.2d 11 (1975).
22. Plaintiffs instituted their suit in 1965. The history of the Hamer litigation involves
three separate appeals. In People ex rel. Hamer v. Jones, 39 Ill.2d 360, 235 N.E.2d 589
(1968), the supreme court affirmed a dismissal of the complaint because of the chaos that
the remedy would bring about, and because of the likelihood of legislative action. Plain-
tiffs next refiled their suit seeking injunctive and mandamus relief against the Depart-
ment and its director. In Hamer v. Mahin, 47 Ill.2d 252, 265 N.E.2d 151 (1970), the
supreme court reversed the lower court's dismissal of this suit and remanded for further
proceedings. These further proceedings resulted in a summary judgment for defendants
which was again reversed and remanded, this time by the appellate court in Hamer v.
Mahin, 13 Ill.App.3d 51, 299 N.E.2d 595 (2d Dist. 1973). It is the appeal from these last
proceedings on remand which resulted in the Hamer case which is the subject of this
Comment.
23. Evidence showed further that the equalized assessed value for 1973 would range
PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS
level of equalized property assessments of less than 42 percent of full
value.2"
The Department filed an interlocutory appeal25 to the Illinois Su-
preme Court seeking dissolution of the injunction, and a cross-
interlocutory appeal was filed by plaintiffs who objected to the 42 per-
cent valuation figure. Plaintiffs wished to have the injunction level set
at 50 percent of actual value, as required by law. The court granted a
stay of enforcement of the injunction pending outcome of the appeal,
thereby enabling the Department to certify the improper 1974 multi-
pliers to the individual counties."8 As to the appeal itself, the justices'
inability to fashion a suitable remedy precluded their granting the relief
that the taxpayers sought, despite their extreme displeasure with the
Department's conduct.
The court had considered two possible remedies: compelling the re-
computation of the previously certified 1974 multipliers, or acting pro-
spectively only and requiring uniformity as to 1975 taxes, payable in
1976.7 They chose the latter alternative and remanded the case to the
circuit court, basing their decision on the premise that to compel recom-
putation of the multipliers would have a significantly adverse impact on
the operations of various local taxing bodies. Of paramount importance
was the fact that recomputation would delay needed funding at the local
from a high of 53.23% in Du Page County to a low of 36.01% in Effingham County, and
that in the 30 counties that had been assigned a multiplier of 1.00 the range of equalized
assessed value was from a high of 53.23% to a low of 36.01%. 60 Ill.2d at 405, 328 N.E.2d
at 14. The assignment of a multiplier of 1.00 means that there would be no change in the
median assessment level for that tax year. As to the 1974 equalized values, the Depart-
ment filed two reports with the circuit court. One report showed that prior to equalization
the three-year weighted average median assessment level ranged from 5.78% in Johnson
County to 50.32% in Wabash County. Id. at 406-07, 328 N.E.2d at 15. The second report
consisted of the Department's control sheet showing tentative 1974 multipliers which had
been certified to all but 10 counties between December 16, 1974 and January 30, 1975.
Read together, the two reports show a range of equalized assessed values as to the 92
counties certified from 25.13% to 50.32%. An example of the lack of uniformity reflected
in the preliminary multipliers was the fact that the level of assessment prior to equaliza-
tion in the 31 counties receiving a multiplier of 1.00 varied from 35.43% to 50.32%. Id. at
407, 328 N.E.2d at 15.
24. Id. at 408, 328 N.E.2d at 15.
25. Id. at 407-08, 328 N.E.2d at 15. The appeal was taken directly to the supreme court
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(b) (cases in which public interest requires
expeditious determination). ImL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, §302(b) (1975).
26. 60 Ill.2d at 408, 328 N.E.2d at 16.
27. Id. at 409, 328 N.E.2d at 16.
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level, perhaps necessitating the borrowing of funds. 8 An understanding
of this underlying rationale for the court's election of a prospective rem-
edy is central to any analysis of the impact of Hamer on the equalization
process.
IMPACT OF HAMER: THE QUESTION OF ABDICATION
The major question posed by the Hamer decision is whether it consti-
tutes an abdication by the court of its responsibility to enforce the
revenue laws of Illinois." If the court has tacitly adopted a position of
noninterference in equalization matters, then the Department is free to
continue its blatant disregard of constitutionally and statutorily man-
dated procedures, with the traditional remedies of mandamus and con-
tempt continuing to be as ineffective as they have been in the past." The
taxpayers' options would then apparently be limited to a direct action
against the director of the Department," or possibly a federal equal
28. The real deterrent to compelling compliance . . . is the delay which that
course of action necessarily involves .... To require the Department to recom-
pute and recertify multipliers . . . would nullify the progress heretofore made
by the county clerks .... Substantial delay in the collection of taxes would
inevitably result, necessitating the borrowing of funds .... The costs of such
borrowing will ultimately reduce the funds available to the taxing bodies,
thereby curtailing to some extent their normal operations.
Id. at 410, 328 N.E.2d at 17. But see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §811.1 (1975). See P.A. 78-
1097, 119741 Ill. Laws 669 (eff. July 26, 1974). Section 811.1 specifically addresses the
failure of the Department to fulfill its equalizing duty. It also allows certain defined
counties (any county having an elected assessor and four assessment districts) to compute
and extend taxes without having to wait for the Department to certify a multiplier. While
section 811.1 does not address all the local taxing bodies, it does indicate that the court's
fear of a funding delay caused by recomputation can be dealt with by the legislature.
Apparently, however, the court either did not know of section 811.1, or else they were not
persuaded of its effectiveness as a state-wide taxing tool. This is a legitimate fear, indeed,
when one considers the myriad of taxing bodies in the state, and the fact that smaller
counties might not have the capabilities to extend taxes to all these units on their own.
29. Justice Kluczynski, dissenting, claims that Hamer does in effect constitute such an
abdication. 60 Ill.2d at 411, 328 N.E.2d at 17 (Kluczynski, J., dissenting). See notes 38-
44 and accompanying text infra.
30. The history of the Hamer litigation illustrates the ineffectiveness of these remedies.
Since the inception of the original suit, see note 22 supra, plaintiffs have been unsuccessful
in obtaining either a writ of mandamus or a contempt citation, although both have been
specifically requested time and again. As to the reluctance of the courts to issue writs of
mandamus, see People ex rel. Hamer v. Jones, 39 Ill.2d 360, 235 N.E.2d 589 (1968); People
ex rel. Bradford Nat'l Bank v. School Directors, 309 Ill.App. 242, 32 N.E.2d 1008 (4th Dist.
1941). As to contempt citations, they have simply not been issued. The lower court in
Hamer preferred to use injunctive relief instead. 60 Ill.2d at 405-06, 328 N.E.2d at 14. But
see notes 44-45 infra.
31. Various penalties, including removal from office and double damages, are set forth
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protection action.-2
The Hamer court would obviously contend that its decision consti-
tutes no abdication of responsibilities. Indeed, the court clearly indi-
cates that it expects the Department to comply with statutory equaliza-
tion requirements in 1975.13 Action taken by the court in the subsequent
case of Harte v. Lehnhausen 4 substantiates the fact that the court be-
lieves the Hamer decision will be effective in providing relief. In Harte,
plaintiff sought to enjoin certification of 1972 multipliers and to recom-
pute the state aid payments made to Cook County school districts from
1969 through 1971, based on the fact that all Illinois counties had not
been equalized properly.'35 The court affirmed the lower court's dismissal
since Cook County, but not other counties, had been equalized at the
lawful 50 percent level .3 As to the problem of the other counties the
court stated:
As to equalized, assessed valuations for 1975 taxes, payable in 1976,
a different situation exists. As to them our judgment in Hamer v.
Lehnhausen ...should prove dispositive and eliminate inequities in
future years."
Despite the court's apparent belief that Hamer will provide prospec-
tive relief with a minimal amount of disruption, it may in fact provide
no relief and still disrupt local funding. Even after Hamer, taxpayers
in IL.. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§803, 804 (1975).
32. States are allowed great discretion in establishing their taxing laws and equal pro-
tection challenges against such laws are difficult to sustain. See San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356 (1973). However, the present equalization problem in Illinois can be distin-
guished from these two precedents. Plaintiffs would not be contending that the Illinois
law itself violated equal protection, but rather that the state's failure to enforce a law
which already mandates uniformity violates equal protection. If an action is brought forth,
the plaintiff can state that there are existing state statutes and constitutional provisions
requiring uniformity of taxes, that the evidence shows a lack of that required uniformity,
and that the failure of the Illinois Supreme Court to act on the matter comes under the
concept of color of law. Even if the federal court decides not to answer the equal protection
cause of action, it still can answer the state question under its ancillary jurisdiction. See
generally C.A. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 62-65 (2d ed. 1970).
33. We assume, however, that the plaintiffs will not abandon their efforts to
obtain judicial relief. . . .It should be evident from the views expressed earlier
in this opinion that the persistent disregard of the law apparent in these pro-
ceedings will not be permitted to continue.
60 Ill.2d at 410-11, 328 N.E.2d at 17.
34. 60 Ill.2d 542, 328 N.E.2d 543, cert. denied, 96 S.Ct. 216 (1975).
35. Id. at 543, 328 N.E.2d at 544.
36. Id. at 549-51, 328 N.E.2d at 547-48.
37. Id. at 551, 328 N.E.2d at 548.
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must depend on the good faith of the Department to equalize properly.
Since the Department has refused to grant relief in the past, it is unclear
why the court expects things to be different in the future.
As Justice Kluczynski pointed out in his dissent in Hamer, the reali-
ties of the Hamer case are ripe to reoccur each year.38 He saw "no
presently ascertainable basis from which to conclude that a comparable
chronological sequence of events causing delay may not arise in succeed-
ing years."3 The fact that the lower court has been granted continuing
jurisdiction to oversee the 1975 equalization is meaningless, particularly
since this same method has previously proven ineffectual.
The same remedy problem of recomputation versus prospective relief
had been before the lower court regarding the 1973 multipliers. The
court chose not to recompute the 1973 multipliers, but rather to oversee
the computation of the 1974 multipliers.4" The Department was required
to make periodic progress reports. When it became clear to the court
that the Department was not moving toward uniform equalization, an
injunction was granted prohibiting the Department from certifying the
1974 multipliers until they were in compliance with the statute.4 Be-
cause no progress toward equalization had been made, compliance with
the injunction would have created the same delays in funding which
prevented recomputation of the 1973 multipliers. This potential funding
problem was undoubtedly a factor in the supreme court's decision to
stay the injunction," a stay which allowed the Department to certify
the 1974 multipliers, despite the lower court's attempt at prospective
relief. In any event, it is clear that the Department, by its refusal to co-
operate, can force the courts into allowing improper certification of
38. 60 Ill.2d at 412, 328 N.E.2d at 17 (Kluczynski, J., dissenting). As Justice Kluczynski
noted, plaintiffs in Hamer acted as expeditiously as possible. Even with the continuing
jurisdiction of the Lake County court, it is unclear how litigation could be brought to
fruition more quickly. Indeed, the speed with which plaintiffs bring suit is irrelevant as
long as the key to the court's decision continues to lie in a possible funding delay. See
text accompanying notes 39-44 infra.
39. Id. at 412, 328 N.E.2d at 17.
40. The supreme court noted:
ITIhe trial court determined that it was too late to take any judicial action to
correct the problem for the 1973 tax year. Instead, the court announced it would
retain jurisdiction in an attempt to prevent a recurrence as to 1974 taxes.
Id. at 405, 328 N.E.2d at 14.
41. Id. at 406, 328 N.E.2d at 15.
42. Defendants emphasized the harm a delay would cause when they originally asked
the lower court to dissolve its own injunction. On appeal, this portion of the record was
excerpted for the court. Excerpts from Record at C126, Hamer v. Lehnhausen, 60 Ill.2d
400, 328 N.E.2d 11 (1975).
[Vol. 25:725
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multipliers in order to avoid the delayed funding problem. For example,
if under its continuing jurisdiction in Hamer the Lake County court
grants another injunction, the Department would not have to appeal
this injunction in order to raise the fear of delay. Even without a time-
consuming appeal, the lower court may face the possibility that its own
orders would bring about the funding delay. The Department could
simply delay its compliance long enough to- force the lower court to stay
its own injunction.
The only remaining tool available to the court would be a contempt
citation against the Department and its director.43 While this may fi-
nally force the Department's compliance, it would not prevent a delay
in funding, especially in view of the certain appeal by the director."
Ultimately, the Illinois courts must at some time be willing to incur the
adverse funding effects likely to arise from recomputation.
The court's fear of the problems created by delayed funding gives the
Department the ultimate weapon in its battle with the taxpayers.
Continued deference by the courts places the future of statutory compli-
ance on equalization within the total discretion of the Department. At
some point, the court must prove that the Hamer decision has not
resulted in a de facto abdication.
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE: HOUSE BILL 990
While the supreme court was considering Hamer, the general assem-
bly attempted to correct the ills of the system by passing H.B. 990.11
H.B. 990 made two major changes in the Revenue Act of 1939. The first
change merely lowered the statutory level of equalized values from 50
43. Public officials are not immune by virtue of their offices from punishment for
contempt. Land v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 623, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Ex Parte Craig, 282 F. 138,
153 (2d Cir.), aff'd sub noma. Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 (1923).
44. There is recent precedent in Illinois for holding state officials in contempt. In
O'Leary v. State, Docket No. 74CH1378 (Cir. Ct. Cook Cty., Ill., Jan. 27, 1976), the
Director of the Illinois Department of Revenue, Robert H. Alphin and the Chief Investiga-
tor of the Illinois Department of Revenue, Philip Mitchell, were held in contempt for
allegedly violating a court injunction prohibiting enforcement of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120,
§453.9c (1975) (illegal to transport into or within Illinois, in one lot, more than 2000
cigarettes whose packages are not tax stamped). Messrs. Alphin and Mitchell were sent-
enced respectively to 10 days and 20 days in the Cook County jail. Judge Donald O'Brien
refused to stay execution of the sentences. A stay of execution has since been granted by
Justice Mayer Goldberg of the appellate court, pending appeal. O'Leary v. State, Docket
No. 76-391 (11. App. Ct., 1st Dist., filed March 23, 1976), leave to appeal granted, Docket
No. 43329 (Sup. Ct. Ill., May 28, 1976).
45. P.A. 79-703 (eff. Sept. 3, 1975), amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§482, 488-89,
501, 501a-1, 501b-1, 502, 502a-1, 502a-3, 524, 530, 532, 535, 537, 555, 557, 561, 563, 568,
581, 589.1, 612, 627, 629a, 630, 632a, 643, 643a, 645a, 728a, 804 (1975).
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percent to 33 1/3 percent of actual value.4"
The second and more important change made by H.B. 990 is found
in section 627,11 where a provision was added to gradually move the
equalized values to the 33 1/3 percent level over a three year period.
From reading the extremely confusing language of the revised provision,
it appears that in subparagraph (1), if a multiplier of less than 1.00
would be necessary to reach a 33 1/3 percent level for the 1975 and 1976
tax years (assessments above the 33 1/3 percent level), that multiplier
would be ignored, and the aggregate equalized assessments for 1974
would be used instead." Therefore, if a county was at an equalized
assessment level of 45 percent for 1974, that same equalized value would
remain for the 1975 and 1976 tax years, since to obtain a level of 33 1/3
percent a multiplier of approximately 0.75 would have to be used."8 For
the 1977 tax year the correct multiplier would be used to finally reach
the statutory assessment level of 33 1/3 percent.
Subparagraph (2) allows a transition period of three years in which
the Department must bring all assessments below 33 1/3 percent up to
this prescribed level in equal yearly installments." Therefore, if a county
is at an equalized assessment level of 24 percent, three percent
(rounded) must be added to the assessment level for each of the next
three years. So for the 1975 tax year the equalized assessment level
would be 27 percent, for 1976 it would be 30 percent, and for 1977 it
would be 33 1/3 percent."1
46. This change is made in each section of the Act in which the term fair cash value
appears. hi.i. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§482(24), 488-89, 501, 501a-1, 501b-1, 502, 502a-1, 502a-
3, 524, 530, 532, 535, 537, 555, 557, 561, 563, 568, 581, 589.1, 612, 627, 630, 804 (1975).
47. Id, §627.
48. Id.
49. The following example illustrates the difference between remaining at an equalized
value of 45% and dropping to a value of 33 1/3% in terms of school aid.
Facts: residence with market value-$90,000
tax rate=$1.08 per $100 assessed value
basic state grant=$520 per child
At 45% At 33 1/3%
45% x $90,000=$40,500 33 1/3% x $90,000=$30,000
$40,500 x $1.08/$100=$437.50 $30,000 x $1.08/$100=$324
$520 - $437.50=$82.50 $520 -$324=$196
Difference: $196 - $82.50=$113.50 per child
50. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §627(2) (1975).
51. The following example illustrates the effects of such a gradual change, using the
funds that will come from the state common school fund.
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Despite the remedial intent of H.B. 990, it is not clear how merely
changing the level of equalized assessments from 50 to 33 1/3 percent
corrects the internal failures and problems of the Illinois equalization
process. Theoretically, it does not matter, except for levy limitations,"
whether one equalizes at 100 percent, 50 percent, 33 1/3 percent, or one
percent of actual market value so long as all property is assessed
uniformly."3 Ultimately, the effectiveness of this new program hinges
upon the cooperation of the Department. If the Department chooses not
Facts: residence with market value=$90,000
tax rate=$1.08/$100 assessed value






















52. The following example illustrates the results of changing the valuation level from
50" to 33 1/3'i, if the existing tax rate is not adjusted.
Facts: residence with market value=$90,000




Result: $486 school tax
At 33 1/3%
33 1/3% x $90,000=$30,000
$30,000 x $1.08/$100=$324
Result: $324 school tax
53. This position would be valid if all assessing and equalization were done compe-
tently, but in actual practice there is a tendency for nonuniformity to increase when
property is assessed at low fractions of full value. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13,
at 56-57; STAUBER, supra note 14, at 52; MacDougall & Jaffe, Prospects for Assessment
Reform: An Overview, in PROPERTY TAX REFORM: THE ROLE OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN THE
NATION'S REVENUE SYSTEM 32, 40-41 (1973). Many reasons have been advanced for the
lowering of the equalized assessment levels in the different property tax reforms, but the
most prevalent one is political. This Comment does not discuss the relative merits of
various assessment levels, but the reader should be aware of the non-technical reasons for
change. A lower assessment level shows the taxpayer a lower value on his property. There-
fore, he feels less hostile when the tax bill finally arrives.
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to cooperate, once again relief would have to be obtained in the courts.
This would resurrect the specter of delayed funding, presenting the
courts with another Hamer dilemma.
One further word of caution is in order concerning H.B. 990. Over the
past years, the court has continually looked to the general assembly to
solve the equalization problem. 54 After years of inaction, the court still
deferred immediate action in Hamer. Now, with H.B. 990's three year
phase-in, the court has a convenient excuse to continue to defer action,
at least for those three years. 5 If, after three years, the Department has
not equalized as required by H.B. 990, then Hamer will have reap-
peared.
CONCLUSION
It is evident that the Department of Local Government Affairs has not
been performing its statutory duty as the state's equalizing authority.
Whether it will in the future is still an open question, notwithstanding
the Hamer decision and the enactment of H.B. 990. The Department
does not have discretion to decide whether or not to equalize. Section
627 of the Revenue Act states that the Department shall equalize.5" The
malfeasance of both the local officials and the Department "has not only
eliminated any possibility of uniformity in taxation, but has also dis-
rupted the statutory scheme of state aid apportioned on the basis of
equalized assessed valuations. '57
The Department is not the only party to be blamed for this disregard
of the law; the general assembly and the governor" must also share in
it. Both the executive and the legislature have a duty and responsibility
to guide and direct the agencies and departments that make up the state
government. This persistent disregard for the law and the rights of the
taxpayer cannot be allowed to continue. After a quarter of a century of
litigation the taxpayer has a right to better treatment.
John P. Higgins
54. See, e.g., People ex rel. Hamer v. Jones, 39 Ill.2d 360, 372, 235 N.E.2d 589, 596
(1968); People ex rel. Schmulbach v. City of St. Louis, 408 I1. 491, 499, 97 N.E.2d 252,
256 (1951).
55. Indeed, it appears that the court has to allow nonuniform equalized values to exist
for three years, according to the provisions of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §627 (1975).
56. Id.; People ex rel. Ruchty v. Saad, 411 11. 390, 394, 104 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1952).
57. 60 1ll.2d at 409, 328 N.E.2d at 16.
58. Some blame for the equalization problems can be laid directly at the door of Gover-
nor Daniel Walker. In February, 1973, the governor ordered multipliers frozen. Thus the
1972 multipliers carried forward the inequities of the 1971 valuation. Harte v. Lehnhau-
sen, 60 Ill.2d 542, 547, 328 N.E.2d 543, 546 (1975).
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